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Abstract 
We present a program that manages a database 
of temporally scoped beliefs. The basic function­
ality of the system includes maintaining a net­
work of constraints among time points, support­
ing a variety of fetches, mediating the applica­
tion of causal rules, monitoring intervals of time 
for the addition of new facts, and managing data 
dependencies that keep the database consistent. 
At this level the system operates independent of 
any measure of belief or belief calculus. We pro­
vide an example of how an application program 
might use this functionality to implement a belief 
calculus. 
1 Introduction 
How to reason with time-what state the world 
is in, what states it might take on in the fu­
ture, and how the past and present affect what 
is to be-is something that most of our theories 
must take into account, and that most of our pro­
grams must do somehow. Furthermore, in all but 
the most simplistic and constrained worlds one 
must also deal with the fact that one's knowl­
edge of the world is rarely certain. One typi­
cally doesn't know exactly what state the world 
is in, or exactly the effect one's actions will have 
when they are actually performed. And even if 
one is reasonably sure about these factors, there 
are often other actors or autonomous forces in 
the world that must be taken into account. But 
even given the ubiquity of temporal reasoning 
in solving planning, scheduling, and projection 
problems, and the inherent uncertainty of these 
domains, we know of no efforts to incorporate an 
*This reasearch was supported by DARPA/BRL grant 
DAAA15-87-K-0001. Thanks to Drew McDermott, Jim 
Firby, and Lucian Hughes, who were their usual helpful 
selves. 
114 
explicit model of uncertainty into a temporal rep­
resentation or into a program that reasons with 
a rich model of time. 
We will discuss in this paper a research effort 
directed toward this goal: a program that man­
ages a temporal database in which facts are not 
certainly true and in which one's knowledge is 
both incomplete and dynamic. We are build­
ing this temporal database manager to support 
a plan projection/evaluation program. The pro­
jection program, which evaluates the effects of 
performing actions in an uncertain world, is it­
self part of a planning system that we are de­
veloping at Yale. In the first part of the paper 
we will motivate the research by looking at the 
bigger picture-the problems involved with tem­
poral reasoning, plan projection and planning in 
an uncertain world. The rest of the paper will be 
spent describing the philosophy behind and the 
implementation of the temporal belief manager 
(TBM) itself. 
2 Planning and Plan Pro­
jection 
The problem of plan projection might be stated 
as that of reasoning about the expected rami­
fications of taking some action or series of ac­
tions, given what is believed about the world, 
what actions one has previously committed to, 
and what are believed to be the immediate effects 
of the actions. What we want from the projector 
is some small set of scenarios-ways the world 
might turn out if the contemplated actions were 
actually taken. The scenarios should be in some 
sense "significant," or "interesting." There will 
typically be a great number of ways the world 
might turn out, and we don't care about most of 
them. Of course a reasonable definition of sig­
nificance is very difficult, and we will not pursue 
one here. It is clear, however, that judging the 
significance of a scenario involves a tradeoff be­
tween the likelihood that the scenario will be real­
ized and the impact that such an outcome would 
have on the planner's goals. Such is the province 
of decision analysis, though it is unlikely that a 
projection program would be able to undertake 
a rigorous analysis in the manner described by 
Raiffa [12]. In a reasonably complex planning do­
main we will not be able to describe exhaustively 
the ways the world might turn out in response to 
our actions, and a formal characterization of the 
utility function will tend to be difficult as well. 
For the moment we are worrying about how to 
make the risk and impact information available 
to the planner quickly; what it then does with 
the information is the topic of future papers. 
Automated planning systems have not dealt 
with the projection problem in any generality. 
Instead they have either recognized it but not 
attempted a solution (Wilensky [16], Hammond, 
[8]), or introduced into the planning paradigm 
assumptions that made it much easier (Fikes [6], 
Sacerdoti [13], and Firby [7]). The focus of our 
attention will be this last group-the series of 
reductionist planners including STRIPS, NOAH, 
NONLIN and FORBIN. 
- The approach taken by reductionist planners 
can be characterized as follows: given a goal, they 
retrieve from some plan library a plan that will 
achieve the goal. This plan may contain primitive 
actions (that may be performed in the world) and 
subgoals, which in turn must be achieved. The 
plan is entered into a data structure called the 
task network, which records the planner's goals, 
the plans and actions it has chosen in order to 
achieve those goals, the subgoals spawned to en­
able the subplans, and so on. (See, for example, 
Charniak and McDermott, [3, chapter 9].) The 
planner then goes on to plan to achieve the new 
subgoals and to order the actions so as to elim­
inate unwanted interactions. The task network 
records the planner's commitments to perform 
actions as well as what it knows about the plan­
ning world, thus contains at least part of the in­
formation needed to do plan projection. 
And it turns out that due to certain very strin­
gent certainty assumptions made (implicitly) by 
these planners, the task network is all that's nec­
essary to do plan projection, and in fact mainte­
nance of the task network is identical to projec­
tion. This state of affairs conflates several con­
cepts that need to be considered separately when 
the certainty assumptions are relaxed. 
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First we should list those assumptions. The 
first is that the state of the world is known ex­
actly and completely at the beginning of the plan­
ning task. The second is that the effects of all 
actions executed at the behest of the planner are 
known exactly. And third is that the planner is 
the only thing that makes changes to the world; 
that is, there are no other planning agents or au­
tonomous forces at work in the planning world. 
(Or at least if there are, their actions and the ef­
fects of those actions are known with certainty.) 
These assumptions lead to an interesting state 
of affairs. Most notably, there is no particular 
problem about maintaining a view of the world: 
the task network always contains a complete and 
accurate record of every fact of interest to the 
planner. The distinction between planning time 
and execution time is similarly obscured: there is 
no need to wait and see if a particular plan will 
work when it is executed, in that all the informa­
tion needed to make that judgement is available 
when the plan is built. And therefore the prob­
lem of plan projection (in the sense of reasoning 
about the effects of the planner's actions on the 
"real" world) is no different from building the 
plan in the first place. Both depend only on the 
task network (and not, for example, on obser­
vations gathered from the external world), and 
both can be done at plan-construction time. 
Of course when the certainty assumptions are 
relaxed these distinctions become apparent, and 
projection becomes an interesting problem in its 
own right. At Yale we are reconsidering the 
paradigm of reductionist planning in a domain 
that admits uncertainty in a limited fashion. We 
are considering an autonomous mobile supply 
robot that travels along known roads and plans 
to achieve goals like "have 20 barrels of gasoline 
at the fuel depot by 9:00 tomorrow morning." 
We relax all three of the uncertainty assumptions 
above. At any point in the planning process the 
planner will have only limited information about 
the state of the world: it can't be certain, for ex­
ample, that the fuel drums will be in the loading 
dock where it expects to find them. The effects 
of actions may not be known with certainty: the 
amount of time it takes to traverse a particu­
lar road is a random variable whose distribution 
depends on the speed of the truck and other fac­
tors like the time of day and the weather. Au­
tonomous processes, like the weather, operate in 
the planner's world and affect the outcome of the 
planner's actions. The behavior of autonomous 
processes can be forecasted with varying degrees 
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of precision and at varying costs. 
In such a world there is a distinction between 
commiting to perform a certain task and actually 
performing the task, thus a distinction between 
planning and execution and between the task net­
work and the planner's view of the world. In 
our planning architecture the planner maintains 
the former and the projector maintains the latter. 
(Of course the two aren't completely separate­
the planner will typically need to know the ex­
pected state of the world in order to choose ap­
propriate plans.) 
As we mentioned above, one of the main re­
sponsibilities of the the projector is to maintain 
a view of the planning world. Because of the un­
certain nature of the world the projector keeps a 
record of what the planner believes rather than 
what is true; because of the dynamic nature of 
the world these beliefs tend to change over time, 
both due to the addition of new information and 
because of the tendency of information to "de­
cay" over time. This paper discusses the ma­
chinery necessary to support reasoning of this 
sort. First we discuss existing systems that do 
temporal reasoning and belief maintenance, in or­
der to point out the functional needs and justify 
- the application-level functionality of our system. 
Then we describe the data types and procedures 
that implement that functionality, and provide 
an example. 
3 Temporal Reasoning and 
Uncertainty 
Three main problems concern programs that sup­
port temporal reasoning (for example the work 
of Dean [4], Allen and Kautz [1], and Williams 
[17]): one is to keep track of the temporal re­
lations that hold between what is known, the 
second is to respond to queries about what is 
known based on these relations, and the third 
is to support inference-to add to what is known 
based on the old facts and their temporal prox­
imity. Most systems have concerned themselves 
with the first problem-maintaining a consistent 
set of temporal constraints and processing addi­
tions, deletions and queries efficiently. We will 
speak mostly about Tom Dean's work here be­
cause he treats the problem of fact retrieval and 
inference more completely than the others; the 
discussion of constraint maintenance applies to 
the other systems as well. 
All of these temporal reasoning systems tol-
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erate uncertainty to some limited degree, in 
that relationships among the temporal objects 
(time points or intervals) can be under-specified. 
Allen's system keeps track of relationships be­
tween time intervals, like equals, before, after, 
overlaps, etc. For any two intervals the system 
maintains the set of relationships that can hold 
between them, given the current set of con­
straints. Thus uncertainty is represented in the 
implicit disjunction. Similarly, Dean's system 
records the distance between two time points as 
a range of numbers, allowing the possibility that 
one is uncertain about the order in which two 
points occur temporally. 
So the uncertainty in Dean's temporal reason­
ing system is that inherent in the partial order­
ing of time points imposed by the constraints­
uncertainty is permitted about when things are 
believed, but not about the extent to which things 
are believed. Within that framework he provides 
several methods of resolving or reasoning about 
that uncertainty. Two such mechanisms are "fact 
persistence" and "default constraint queries." 
Dean's "rule of persistence" is a simplified im­
plementation of McDermott's notion of fact per­
sistence in [10]. The basic idea is that when one 
asserts that a fact begins to be true at some point 
in time, one typically doesn't know when it is go­
ing to stop being true. In the persistence model 
a fact tends to remain true (forever, in Dean's 
implementation) unless and until the fact is con­
tradicted by a contradictory fact. So the rule of 
persistence is a way of resolving the uncertainty 
in the partial order of time points by letting the 
endpoints of facts lie as temporally late as consis­
tently possible. Below we present an implementa­
tion of a more sophisticated model of persistence. 
Default constraint queries allow the program 
to reason hypothetically about the possibility 
that the partial order will resolve itself in a cer­
tain way. The application program asks the 
database manager "is it consistent to believe that 
point Pt occurs later than point p2?" and if this 
query is consistent with the current partial or­
der the database manager returns a "yes" answer 
and sets up data dependencies ensuring that the 
application program will be notified if this as­
sumption is violated. This provides the appli­
cation program with a way of reducing uncer­
tainty in the system through making assump­
tions. Our system again provides a more gen­
eral notion of associating beliefs with statements 
about the constraint network. 
Dean also speaks about dealing with uncer-
tainty by maintaining and reasoning about "par­
tial world descriptions," which are sets of alterna­
tive planning options, or courses of events, associ­
ated with the current partial order. This is close 
in spirit, but different in implementation from 
our model of reasoning in hypothetical worlds 
that we will discuss in the last section. 
4 Belief Maintenance 
Now that we've discussed programs that reason 
about time we should turn our attention to pro­
grams that reason about belief. There is less to 
talk about here just because the uncertainty peo­
ple have not had to deal with temporal issues 
in the same way the temporal people have had 
to deal with uncertainty. Uncertainty seems to 
creep in to temporal reasoning no matter how 
hard one tries to assume it away, while those that 
deal in beliefs and uncertainty can assume time 
away and still get some interesting work done. 
The uncertainty-related issues we have to deal 
with are the usual ones: what is a a reasonable 
way to express uncertainty, belief, ignorance? 
How does one combine old beliefs, which may be 
interdependent or inconsistent, into new beliefs, 
and do so quickly. 
Among the systems for the domain­
independent maintenance of a network of beliefs, 
for example Pearl [11], Tong et. al. [15] and 
Falkenhainer [5], our work is most similar to the 
last. Our system, like his, tries to make available 
to an application program the machinery nec­
essary to support probabilistic inference, with­
out committing to a particular representation or 
combination paradigm. In fact, our work might 
be superficially characterized as an extension of 
Dean's Time-Map Manager to include an explicit 
representation of uncertainty, or an extension of 
Falkenhainer's Belief-Maintenance System to in­
clude an explicit representation of time. 
5 System Overview 
Now we can begin an overview of the TBM pro­
gram, which we will do by describing the data 
types it defines and the operations it performs on 
them. We will start with the temporal constraint 
network, then work our way up to computing be­
liefs and performing inference. 
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5.1 Temporal objects 
The basic temporal object is the time-point, 
which denotes an instant of time. The distance 
between two points is stored as a pair of num­
bers (which may be infinite) representing the 
belief that the actual distance between the two 
points lies somewhere in the interval defined by 
the range. An application program constrains 
temporal distance by posting constraints, which 
involve a pair of points and a pair of numbers 
indicating the distance. Time-intervals denote a 
continuous stretch of time, and are built out of 
time points. 
A novel idea is that of a temporal overlay. 
An overlay is a partition of time into packets 
of an application-supplied "grain size," and con­
tains points, intervals, beliefs, etc. The applica­
tion program defines these overlays, which are 
supposed to reflect the structure of its problem­
solving task: the idea is that points within an 
overlay are typically interrelated (and therefore 
the application program will probably be inter­
ested in the distance between them), but that 
points in different overlays are probably not (thus 
a distance estimate may be less accurate and 
harder to come by). By specifying a grain size 
the application tells the TBM that temporal du­
rations shorter than this duration are insignifi­
cant. The TBM guarantees to return inter-point 
distance estimates to within the accuracy of the 
grain size, but no better. Computing these dis­
tance estimates, and adding new points and in­
tervals to the overlays, are both extremely fast. 
The other advantage to overlays is that they 
limit the number of objects that need to be 
searched during fetches. The application may 
ask the system to fetch all the beliefs of a certain 
type, for example, and in doing so must supply 
a set of overlays in which the fetch is to take 
place. Of course some beliefs may be missed if 
the application doesn't supply the right ones, but 
it can control the tradeoff between how long the 
fetch takes and how likely the system is to find 
all instances. It is also able to direct the sys­
tem toward those overlays that are most likely to 
contain the right beliefs. 
Note that overlays are somewhat different from 
Allen's reference intervals [1]. Overlays need not 
be disjoint, either temporally or in the points 
they contain. In fact we expect it would be com­
mon for an application program to view a certain 
stretch of time through more than one overlay­
one with a large grain size for higher level plan-
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ning and one with a smaller grain size for detailed 
scheduling. Time points introduced in the course 
of low-level plan expansions would thus never ap­
pear in the coarser overlay. Overlays seem to 
offer the same efficiency advantages as reference 
intervals, but are a good deal more flexible. 
From here on, when we speak of adding a point 
or a belief to the system, or fetching beliefs of a 
certain type, we will implicitly mean "with re­
spect to a set of overlays." 
5.2 Beliefs, monitors, and infer­
ence rules 
The data type belief-instance represents belief 
in a type over a duration, and with a strength. 
The type is an S-expression, the duration is a 
time point or interval as defined above, and the 
strength is a quantity representing strength of 
belief, which is defined and manipulated by the 
application program. Belief instances have some 
other information that allows them to be updated 
as the system changes. The first is a list of objects 
(typically other beliefs or inference rules) that the 
belief depends on-that is, the objects were used 
to calculate the belief's strength. Next is the 
belief's signal-functio�a function that is called 
when any of the objects it depends on changes 
in some way. Thus the belief can adjust itself to 
changes in the network. It is generally the appli­
cation program's responsibility to build these be­
lief instances (including the signal functions); the 
TBM in turn makes sure that the belief instance 
is placed correctly in the temporal network, and 
makes sure that it is signalled when any relevant 
conditions change. 
The system supports one more kind of belief­
beliefs about point-to-point distances. the appli­
cation can ask the TBM to assess the belief that 
the distance between two points is in a certain 
range. The TBM then computes its best cur­
rent estimate of the distance, and passes it to an 
(application-supplied) function that computes a 
belief strength. The system then posts this belief 
and sets up the data dependencies ensuring that 
the belief's signal function will be called if the 
distance assumption is ever violated. 
Monitors represent "absence of belief" in some 
sense. One may base belief in a proposition on 
lack of belief in some other proposition. For 
example, I may believe that my tennis match 
this afternoon will indeed be played because I 
believe that it will be sunny at 5PM. This be­
lief may in turn be based on the fact that it 
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was sunny this morning, and also that there will 
be no rainstorms between now and 5PM. One 
way to represent this state of affairs is by in­
stalling a monitor, which looks for beliefs in factf 
of type "rainstorm," over the interval between 
now and 5PM. The monitor has a function that 
will be called if any such beliefs are added, and 
should then call the signal function of my belief 
in "sunny at 5PM" (which may in turn call the 
signal function of my belief in "tennis match will 
be played." Monitors correspond to the idea of 
"anti-protection" that Dean speaks about in [4J. 
The implementation is problematic in his time­
map manager, but fits nicely and runs efficiently 
in our overlay-based implementation. 
Causal-rules are the way the application pro­
gram gets the TBM to do inference. Rules are 
temporally scoped (so they apply only to specific 
periods of time) and are added to overlays (so as 
to limit the amount of work that needs to be done 
to monitor their firing). The significant slots in a 
causal rule object are the precondition patterns, 
the trigger pattern, and the consequent pattern. 
The basic idea is that if a rule spans a certain 
interval of time in an overlay and a trigger event 
occurs at some point in time when all the pre­
condition patterns are true, that should generate 
a belief in the consequent pattern at the time the 
trigger occurs. 
Patterns are S-expressions, and may contain 
variables under the restriction that any variables 
in the precondition patterns must also appear in 
the trigger pattern. Thus once an occurence of 
the trigger pattern has been identified the system 
can determine whether a particular rule should 
fire just by searching for ground instances of the 
precondition patterns. 
In addition to the various patterns, the appli­
cation must also supply a function that decides 
on a belief strength for the consequent, given be­
liefs in the preconditions and in the trigger (and 
possibly other information as well). 
Much of the work the system does in maintain­
ing these rules involves trying to ensure that the 
rules fire whenever necessary, but never unnec­
essarily. The algorithm goes something like this: 
when an application wants to know the belief in a 
pattern that is the consequent of a rule (or more 
precisely, can be unified with the consequent of a 
rule) the system tries to produce all instances of 
the consequent within a period of time preceding 
the request by the consequent-duratio�a length 
of time supplied by the application as part of the 
rule. It assumes that any firings prior to that are 
of no interest. First it looks for all instances of 
the trigger pattern (suitably instantiated) that 
occur in that interval. Then for each such in­
stance it assesses its belief in all the precondition 
patterns at the point of the trigger's occurence. 
It then calls the rule's generator function (men­
tioned above) that builds a belief instance for the 
consequent. 
In addition to creating the new instance the 
system sets up dependencies to make sure that 
the rule is subsequently fired if its preconditions 
are met. The assumption is that since the ap­
plication asked about the consequent pattern in 
an interval it will also be interested in subsequent 
rule firings in that interval. For each rule the sys­
tem sets up a monitor that will look for new asser­
tions of the trigger pattern, and go through the 
same process of verifying preconditions if one is 
discovered. Further, if it originally found a trig­
ger belief but did not add an instance of the con­
sequent (presumably because the preconditions 
were not believed strongly enough), it sets up 
dependencies that ensure that it will try again 
to add one if belief in the preconditions change. 
Thus once the application expresses an interest 
in a pattern that is the consequent of a rule, it 
can be assured that it will be informed whenever 
the rule can be fired. 
5.3 Summary of functionality 
We've already discussed most of the system's ba­
sic functionality in introducing the data types. 
Another way of looking at the system is as a 
base-level functionality on which to build a be­
lief calculus. Here we summarize the base-level 
functionality and make clear what the applica­
tion program needs to provide to these routines 
in order to compute beliefs. This is what the 
base-level routines do: 
MANIPULATE THE CONSTRAINT NETWORK: 
sessment of the extent to which you believe that 
a particular temporal ordering condition holds. 
RULES: you can define causal rules, as defined 
above, and expect that when you then fetch on 
the consequent rule type the fetch will cause the 
rule to fire, and furthermore it will fire in the 
future if the preconditions are met in the interval 
of interest. 
In turn, the base-level routines depend on the 
application for the following information: 
A DEFINITION FOR THE BELIEF-STRENGTH 
DATA TYPE. This might be a number that takes 
the value 1, 0, or -1, or perhaps a real num­
ber representing a probability, or perhaps a pair 
of numbers representing a "Shafer interval" [14]. 
The base-level routines don't care. 
AN ASSESSOR FUNCTION FOR FACT TYPES. 
The application must define for each fact type an 
"assessor function," which is called whenever the 
application asks the system to assess its belief 
in that fact type. The assessor function takes 
as arguments the fact type itself and a set of 
constraints, and returns an appropriate belief in­
stance. The function is of course free to call the 
base-level routines, in particular to fetch for tem­
porally prior beliefs. The assessor function must 
also build a signal function for this belief-the 
signal function will be called whenever a change 
in the belief network means the belief should be 
reconsidered. 
CAUSAL RULE DEFINITIONS. For each such 
rule the application must supply precondition, 
trigger, and consequent patterns, as well as the 
time interval over which the rule is to be active. 
Additionally the application must supply a "gen­
erator" function, which computes the strength of 
belief in the consequent, given beliefs in the pre­
conditions and belief in the trigger. 
Next we'll look at how we can use these rou­
tines to build a simple belief calculus. 
you can define time points and time intervals, and 
add them to overlays. You can impose distance 6 
constraints on time points. 
Example: A Simple Belief 
Calculus 
FETCHING: you can perform a variety of 
fetches in overlays, but the most important one 
is to fetch all belief instances of a particular type 
that occur over a particular interval of time. 
BELIEFS: you can make a flat assertion of 
belief-"! believe this fact with this strength at 
this point in time" or you can ask the system 
to assess your belief in a fact at a point in time 
(but this requires some functions from the belief 
calculus, as detailed below). You can get an as-
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As an example we will present a problem we have 
used in the past (e.g. in [9]) to explore the way 
certain formal systems handle temporal projec­
tion problems. The example involves three causal 
rules and three events. (Events in our system are 
just belief instances asserting that the event oc­
cured.) Informally put, they are: 
1. Rule 1: If a person is born then that person 
begins being alive. 
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2. Rule 2: If a gun is loaded then that gun 
begins being loaded. 
3. Rule 3: If a person is shot with a loaded gun 
then that person stops being alive. 
4. Event 1: FRED is born. 
5. Event 2: Twenty years later, THE-
MURDER-WEAPON (a gun) is loaded. 
6. Event 3: One hour later, FRED is shot with 
THE-MURDER-WEAPON. 
Given these rules and events, the question is what 
do we believe about FRED's being alive at some 
point in time after the shot. We need to make 
several decisions in representing this problem: 
what is our measure of belief? How do we com­
pute the causal relationship between a "born" 
event and being alive, between a "load" event and 
being loaded, and between a "shoot" event and 
being alive? How do we assess our belief about 
someone's being alive on the basis of prior beliefs, 
and similarly our belief that something is loaded 
based on prior beliefs? We will provide some an­
swers below, such that our program can actually 
produce meaningful results. We stress however, 
that these decisions are going to be pretty arbi­
trary and simplistic-the point is to show in a 
brief example how the program works. 
First the belief strengths: we will just make an 
arbitrary decision and define a belief strength in 
the same way the Falkenhainer does (in [5])-as 
a "Shafer interval" of the form [s(P), s( -. P)], 
where P is the fact type of the belief instance, 
and s is a function mapping a fact type into a 
real number in the interval [0,1] that represents 
the extent to which evidence supports belief in 
its argument. Thus the first number represents 
the extent to which evidence confirms the fact 
and the second represents the extent to which 
evidence disconfirms it. Thus we represent nega­
tion implicitly: evidence confirming P is evidence 
disconfirming -. P, and vice versa. 
Next we'll tackle the persistence of "alive" 
facts. We're going to try one simple model of per­
sistence here: let's say that knowing that some­
one was born counts as a certain amount of ev­
idence that the person is alive, as long as that 
person is younger than 70 years. If he's older 
it's no evidence. But we can get evidence of 
"aliveness" from other sources as well: seeing the 
person alive, seeing the person dead, reading his 
obituary in the National Enquirer, etc. We will 
assume that pieces of evidence of this sort, which 
we will call observations, are entered directly into 
the database as belief instances, thus have belief 
strengths already associated with them. We then 
have to decide how fast the evidence supplied by 
these sources decays over time, and also how to 
combine several observations into a single belief 
strength pair. 
There's a significant asymmetry between being 
alive and being dead. One tends to stay dead, but 
not to stay alive. Thus evidence of one's being 
dead tends to retain its value over time, but not 
so for being alive. We can thus assume that the 
second number of our belief strength will stay the 
same over time. Not so for the first: if I observed 
somebody alive a week ago that's pretty good ev­
idence that he's still alive, but if it was five years 
ago it's a different matter. We'll just assume that 
the evidential value associated with being alive 
decays linearly from the time of observation such 
that six months later such an observation pro­
vides no information. Finally, to combine these 
sources of evidence (his "initial aliveness" and 
any additional observations we may find in the 
database), we will make the usual independence 
assumption and use Dempster's rule. 
That's all the information we need to write the 
assessor function for fact type "alive". Recall 
that the assessor function takes in the fact type 
and a set of constraints (representing the time of 
the query), and returns a belief instance. We're 
most interested in computing the belief strength 
of that instance, and here's how we do it: we 
first need to search back from the time of the 
query (but no further back than the evidence life­
time of six months) to find instances mentioning 
the fact type ({ALIVE FRED}, or something like 
that). We can find two sorts of belief instances: 
observations, and assessments. The first repre­
sents actual sources of evidence, and the second 
represents computed measures of our belief. We 
discard everything prior to the latest assessment, 
leaving us with (at most) one assessment and var­
ious observations that have happened since. We 
then "discount them to the present" by decaying 
the evidence supporting "aliveness" according to 
the function above. We also need to add in the 
evidence that "under 70 indicates being alive," 
so we have to search backward in time looking 
for the person's birth and noting whether it oc­
cured more recently than 70 years ago. (This is 
a horrible state of affairs, but necessary because 
we're not representing the concept of age.) Fi­
nally we apply Dempster's rule, which produces 
a belief strength. We also have to note in the 
belief instance itself those beliefs that our calcu­
lation depended on, so we will be notified if we 
should reconsider the calculation. 
The persistence of the "loaded" fact is easier ' 
due to a different persistence assumption we will 
make. The assumption is that any evidence of 
a gun being loaded or unloaded tends to decay 
over time, gravitating toward a strength of [O,OJ. 
We will assume that the decay is linear over the 
period of one month. Thus the assessor function 
for fact type "loaded" is as follows: search back 
over the past month to find beliefs in "loaded" (it 
doesn't matter in this case whether they are ob­
servations or assessments). Take the latest one 
if any. (If not, the strength is [O,OJ.) Decay th� 
belief strength of that instance from the time of 
the observation to the time of query. This be­
comes the new belief strength. In addition to the 
new belief instance we also need to post a mon­
itor to the database, asking to be notified if any 
new "loaded" facts are added between the latest 
observation and the query, so we can recompute 
the belief strength. 
After all the difficulty building the assessor 
functions, building the causal rules is surprisingly 
easy. We will describe only the third one: "get­
ting shot with a loaded gun is evidence for not 
being alive." The main thing we have to is write 
a function that computes a belief strength for be­
ing alive based on beliefs that the gun was loaded 
and that the shot really occured. 
Both of these quantities are passed as argu­
ments to the function. Assume that the strength 
of belief in "loaded" is [h, b], and the strength 
of belief in "shoot" is [st, s2J · We interpret h as 
the probability that the gun was loaded, and s2 
as the probability that the shot took place, thus 
return the quantity [0, hs1 ] as the evidence that 
the victim is alive as the result of the shot. This 
piece of evidence has to be combined with the 
evidence that the victim was alive at the time of 
the shot. The latter evidence we get through the 
normal assessment process (i.e. we ask the fetch 
routines), and we combine the two using Demp­
ster,s rule. 
Our program runs two variants of the above ex­
ample. In the first case, all the event occurences 
are added (with certainty) then the system is 
asked to assess the likelihood that FRED is alive. 
It reports evidence that he is alive based on the 
fact that he was born some twenty years before, 
and evidence that he is dead based on the oc­
curence of the shot. In the second case we omit 
the "load" event and the system reports no evi-
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dence that he is dead {because it has no evidence 
of the fatal shot, because it has no evidence that 
the gun was loaded) . We can then add the "load" 
event, at which point all the appropriate moni­
tors fire, belief strengths are altered, and the sys­
tem decides that he might have died after all. 
7 Extensions 
We should first mention where future work needs 
to be concentrated. As far as program imple­
mentation, what we need next is a way of rea­
soning about "hypothetical worlds." In contrast 
to Dean's system, which supports simultaneous 
reasoning about partial world descriptions, we 
are experimenting with a system where the world 
"splits" on the basis of a set of assumptions (these 
being constraints placed on the values that belief 
strengths can take on) , and the application then 
explores these hypothetical worlds explicitly and 
separately. Efficiency is the main issue here, in 
that the application must be able to create and 
destroy worlds fairly quickly {though not indis­
criminately). 
Much work needs to be done on the theoretical 
basis for building a belief calculus. as we did in 
the example. We made many arbitrary assump­
tions in our example, which must eventually be 
put on a firmer theoretical footing. The most im­
portant one has to do with combining evidence 
from disparate sources-for example the evidence 
that the gun was fired with the evidence that the 
gun was loaded with the evidence that the victim 
was alive at the time of the shot. 
Add to that a problem that we ignored alto­
gether in the example: the possibility that point 
orderings might lead to ambiguity. In our ex­
ample the events were totally ordered, but if we 
that condition does not hold we have to add to 
the above calculation the evidence that the load­
ing event occured before the shot. Currently the 
assessment of beliefs based on information from 
the constraint network is done in an ad hoc man­
ner. 
8 Conclusion 
What we hope to have accomplished in this pa­
per is to motivate the problem of temporal rea­
soning under uncertainty-to show how it comes 
up in the planning process and why it can't be 
handled either by systems that do temporal rea­
soning or by those that do belief maintenance. 
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We feel that our program is a first step in solving 
this problem; while many technical issues remain 
unsolved, we have demonstrated that the func­
tionality our system offers is adequate to solve 
nontrivial problems in the domain. 
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